©® RODRÍGUEZ GARCÍA, JOSÉ MANUEL, “Idea and Reality of Crusade in Alfonso´s X Reign
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Those are Housley’s words and I just have to agree with him; but I would like to remark two ideas: the first is the leadership role of the Spanish kings in any crusade in their kingdoms; and the second one is that the Reconquista was -or at least all the chroniclers want us to believe so-the recover of the former Christian lands lost at Muslim hands in 711. Therefore, the Iberian peninsula was a crusade scenery, althought not all the campaigns were true crusades. Papal authorization and crusade indulgences and privileges were needed to call a campaigns as a crusade, and the popes, from the very beginning, not also authorized crusades in Spain, but granted to the Iberian crusaders the same crusading privileges which enjoyed those fighting in the Levant. Furthermore, taking into account the great appeal of the Holy Land, even to the Spaniards, the Lateran council of 1123 banned any man or resource from being distracted from the Iberian front.

In 1252, at Alfonso’s accesion to the throne, Castile was the only kingdom which had the possibility to continue with the Reconquista. Portugal and Aragon, -the latter had just finished its crusade against the Muslim kingdom of Valencia-, had reached their expansion limits which had been drawn by the treaty of Almizra in 1244. Thanks to Fernando’s III successful campaigns, Granada and Niebla were the only moorish kingdoms which stayed aside from Castilian dominance, althought both of them were reckoned as Castilian vasals and payed an annual tribute for that.

2. The Perception of Castile. Was there an image of Castile as crusade leader? I do think so, and, in fact, its kings were much more appreciated for this. Castilian victories over the Moors were sung in English(2), French(3) and Norwegian Chronicles(4), as well as in papal letters(5). Even St. Louis seems to have used the fame of the Christian victories in the Peninsula to threaten the sultan al-Malik Salih in a letter adressed to him in 1249(6). Therefore, the crusades in the Iberian peninsula had a prestige and influence over the rest of the Christian kings which Alfonso reckoned and was not ready to loose(7). We should notice that at Fernandos death, the Castilian was the only Christian king who had carried on, successfully, different crusades against the infidels and that his own son, Alfonso, had already participated in two successfull crusades by 1252.

3. Fernando III and Alfonso X: The Castilian kings had two main roles: leading the army against the infidels, or any other enemy, and making justice. Fernando III had perfectly fulfilled this ideal image of the Christian Castilian kings and he was considered as a model and the crusader king "par excellence" both by his contemporaries(8), Alfonso(9), and the following Castilian writers(10). He represented the image of the king as "soldier of Christ"(11), and even the "heroic image" of the Poema de Fernán González as "God loyal servant and conqueror of the lands of the Moors"(12). Alfonso wished to continue with that ideal, represented by his own father. Alfonso accomplished the mission of making justice; and the work of expanding, or just maintaining, the Christian territory can and must be linked to the crusades. Appart from the Iberian front itself, he, and all the chroniclers, were well aware of the danger coming from Muslim Magrib, which could be taken as a continuation of al-Andalus and, consecuently, he was decided to continue with Fernando’s III last plan: carry on the Reconquest to the north of Africa(13).

4. The African crusade. After regaining the control over the peninsular Moors, Alfonso was going to concentrate in the plans for Africa. In fact, there was a total agreement between Castile and the church about the policy to apply on Morocco(14), which was the main area of Castilian interest(15). The Magrib became an Iberian matter(16). Alfonso, well aware of the need of controlling the sea for any adventure in Africa, created and promoted a royal navy with its own ports (Seville), factories and admiral(17). Which would be the aim of this crusade? By 1245, the papacy had already showed its interest to change Salé into a Christian base to attack and control the north of Africa. Salé was a well-known commercial port of the Atlantic coast, just opposite Rabat. In 1245, its ruler Zeid Azan asked for conversion and Innocence IV granted the place to the Spanish Military Order of Santiago(18). Henceforth, the papal plans to promote a crusade in the north of Africa were going to match the Castilian ones. These Castilians plans can be seen both as a continuation of the Reconquista -taking into account that the former Visigoth Spanish kingdom had also been spread in that area-, and a practical way of controlling the north African tribes and the sea. The idea of controlling this area as a step in order to make a crusade which would start in the Peninsula and then would find its way towards the Holy Land, was just un idea which Alfonso seem to have had in mind at the end of his reign, and that seem to belong more to his ideal world than to his real and avalaible common practice(19).

From the very beginning, Alfonso had the papal support in the form of crusade indulgences and privileges (1251,1252,1254). Even the missionaires and their companions to Morocco, mainly Castilians from the mendicant orders, as the bishop of Morocco himself, were granted the same indulgences and privileges as the crusaders to the Holy Land. And the mendicants, -throughout Lope, bishop of Morocco- were incharged of the preaching of that crusade in 1253 and 1255, of course, granting the Holy land indulgences(20).In 1253 the pope authorised any treaty that Alfonso could make with Muslim African rulers(21). In 1254, Alfonso made a treaty with Henry III in which Henry promised English help for a crusade in the north of Africa, once the pope had commuted his vow to go to the Levant(22). Alfonso also talked with Jaime I of Aragon, but the only thing he got from the aragonese was Jaime promise not to ban Aragonese knights from going to this crusade; and Jaime insisted that neither the king of Tunis, Jaime`s vassal, nor his African vassals would suffer any harm(23).

Despite that the "fecho del Imperio", which started in 1256, involved a delay in his plans, Alfonso did not forget the African crusade(24), and finally, after a papal admonition(25), a Castilian fleet, commanded by the "almirante mayor de la mar", Juan García de Villamayor(26), set out for Sale in 1260. There is a lot of discussion about the main reason for this campaign: was it just a propaganda effect in the struggle for the Empire? was it an excuse to justify the money raised for the crusade? The fact is that the Castilian fleet managed to conquer Salé and held it for just a couple of weeks, taking with them a great booty, before the Marinid sultan arrived with reinforcements(27).

Salé wold have been a great base for further operations in Africa. Perhaps, Alfonso just wanted to have a look at the defences and situation of the area. Even the Muslim sources expected this naval force to be joined by infantry trops from Morocco(28), for example those Castilian knights who were serving under different African rulers by that time(29). In fact the fleet, although considerable, was not very important and did not seem to have been any kind of reinforcements waiting neither in the Peninsula nor in Morocco. Anyway, Alfonso continued planning new campaigns, and the conquest of the kingdom of Niebla and the city of Cádiz and its surroundings gave him wider Atlantic coasts from where he could control the sea. The big Mudejar revolt of 1264 would put an end to his project(30). In 1269, the Marinid sultan Abu Yusuf unified most of the Muslim forces of the north of Africa, and Castilian plans had to change taking a defensive side(31). The land and sea siege of Algeciras represented his last attempt to take control of the Strait and the situation of the north of Africa. His sound defeat because of the complete destruction of the royal fleet marked the end of his African crusade.

5. Crusade and Politics. If in 1254, Alfonso had already expanded his African project to England and thus given an international dimension to his project, the "Imperial quest" marqued a new stimulation at the use of the crusade as a political and diplomatic instrument. Since 1257, Alfonso launched an international diplomatic offensive which would achieve, among other things, the situation of Castile as an important power in the western scene. As "emperor" he was supposed to defend the Christendom against the infidels(32). The crusade was the traditional method for that and for a 13th century person it would be very difficult to find a better way to enhance ones prestige than becoming a crusader or, even better, leading, himself, a crusade against the infidels. When in 1257 Richard of Cornwall became himself elected for the Empire, Alfonso met an opponent who had both money and prestige, especially as a crusade leader. In the struggle all the weapons could be used and prestige was one of those. Alfonso, who already enjoyed the fame of the Castilians as crusaders, worked for another method to improve his prestige and influence: surrounding himself with a brilliant court(33). In the same way, I do not think casual the appointment of the archdeacon and the bishop of Morocco as his ambassadors before England and the Imperial powers.

However, I do not agree with those historians who think that the African crusade was just an outcome and an instrument of the imperial struggle. In fact, it is true that it was used to increase his prestige in Europe, but Castilian intentions in Africa were previous to his election as German emperor. I do think we must understand the African crusade as a natural expansion of the Castilian reconquest in the nort of Africa. His diplomatic offensive between 1255 and 1264 led to treaties with Pisa, Marseille, Norway³ and England. One might have expected that the aim of a Holy Roman Imperial crusade should be the Holy Land. However, althought Alfonso got the promise of all the previous powers to assit him in a crusade, this one was not going to be aimed at the liberation of the Holy places. The Alfonsine "imperial" crusade would focus in the north of Africa. At the end nothing came from all those treaties, but this has been used by Spanish historians to support the idea that the adventure for the Roman Empire was really intended to get more influence and prestige over the Peninsular kings and thus imposed the old Castilian tradition of a Peninsular Emperor (34).

We must understand the relationships between Castile and Byzantium within that context of gaining recognition as emperor in the west, from 1256 (35). By 1259, the empress Marie de Brienne visited Castile where she received from her cousin Alfonso X, the money she needed to redeem her son, Philip de Courtneay, heir to the Latin Empire, who from 1248 had been given captive to the Venetian Ferro brothers in guarantee of Baldwin’s debt to them. In the same visit, Philip planned to be married into the house of Castile. In 1263 (6) the project was still discussed but papal opposition and the own Castilian indiference -due both to the internal opposition of the Castilian nobles after the huge ammount of money already spent in the redemption of Philip, and Baldwin friendship with Manfred, Alfonso’s enemy-, made it impossible. In 1269, during a mommentary reconciliation between Alfonso and Charles d’Anjou, there seem to have been new contacts between the three of them in order to recover the empire; plans that were soon given up by the Castilian (36). Appart from these diplomatic contacts, we must notice the presence of Marie de Brienne’s three brothers at the Castilian court, since 1255 to 1275, within the context of a brilliant entourage for the king. Till this point, I have followed Wolf’s work about the subject; nevertheless I would like to add two points. First, we must take into account the Iberian context for this international relationship as well (37). Second, in Las Cantigas, we can see two miracles of the Virgen Mary in defence of Constantinople against the Moors. It looks like the former political thoughts of Alfonso about Constantinople had become a part of his ideal world.

Relationships with Mammeluke sultans could be put into this group of contacts made by Alfonso in his role of Roman emperor; as well as his contacts with the Mongols and even the sect of the Assasins (38).

6. Castile, Alfonso, the Church and the Papacy. The Castilian crusades did not attract attention from the critics of the crusade as a goal, but it did attract criticism for its very scarce interest in the Holy Land affairs; as the Genoese poet Lanfranco Cigala told us:

This charge was mostly true. Altought the Castilians continued taking the cross to the Holy Land , at private level, the Castilian kings had enough with their own holy war at home. Rome had tried to equilibrate the crusade in the Levant and in the Iberian peninsula; but from 1215 (IV Lateran council), the papacy decided to push Castile into the Holy Land crusade and ordered the collection of the Levant crusade tax (1/20 of the church tithe) also in the Peninsula. In fact, popes could not ask for great efforts to the Castilian kings because they carried on a crusade in the Peninsula. Therefore the popes decided to press on the Castilian church. However, the Castilian church soon rejected any demand of money from Rome. We can think about three reasons for this rejection:Firstly- The Castilian church was very involved in the Reconquest: Secondly- in the same way, it was strongly linked and dependant on the Castilian kings -who were very jealous of their resources- and, thirdly, the economic situation of the church was not so enviable as could be thought. The Castilian prelates seem to have strongly protested against these papal attempts of extracting resources of them. Was not them who supported the War, the Crusade in the Peninsula against the infidels; in a war that could mean even Europe’s salvation?..This seems to have been the reason given by the Castilians for their boicot to the Levant taxes in 1215-17 and 1262 (after seven years of dessastreous crops)(40). In fact, the Reconquest was almost based upon the resources of the Castilian church. Fernando III had taken the money and resources from the church either with the agreement of the prelates, or the papal authorisation or even by force. One example is the "tercias" (the half of the third of the fifths, which was ussually dedicated to the fabric of the church -the Castilian church, of course-). In 1247, the pope granted it to Fernando, during three years, for his crusade against Seville. However, from this point onwards, Fernando and all the Castilian kings continued to perceive that sum of money in spite of the protests of both the Castilian church and Rome. Alfonso was not different. He continued extracting the "tercias" and other helps from the church. The only thing popes could do was to change the theoretical taxes raised for the Holy Land, to the use of Alfonso’s campaigns (as in 1255 and 1262-65)(41)

On the other hand, the Castilian church always supported the papacy in its crusades, as the Albigensian one. In(42) 1246, the Castilian church formed the frontline against the Hohenstauffen, perhaps because that was an indirect way to oppose to the control of the church by laymen and kings.

7. Alfonso and the Military Orders: Alfonso continued with the traditional attitude to the Orders in the Castilian kingdom. Alfonso continued relying on the Orders, specially Santiago and Calatrava, both for their military and repopulating role. The Orders, because its discipline and permanent availability had an important role in the defence of the kingdom, althought this king’s dependency on the Military Orders was much less important than that situation in Levant or Germany. In the same way, the Orders were much less independent in Castile than in other kingdoms, specially the national Orders, due to the direct leadership of the monarchy in the war as well as his own important resources. Following his centralizing policy, Alfonso notably decreased the number of new concessions to the Orders (in fact, only Santiago, Calatrava and the Hospital received some), and even in these cases, the king put much care in preserving royal rights in those places. Until 1271, there was a good cooperation between the king and the orders, with an active participation of the latter in the campaigns against Niebla and the Mudejar rebellion. From 1271 to 1281 there was a period of gradual distance between both due to the king’s centralizing policy -fighting against lordship right-, in spite of the continous presence of the Orders in the battlefields against the new Marinid invasion. Finally, from 1281 to 1284 we saw the civil war, when the orders took a clear political side, in favour of his son Sancho(43).

In the last two years a research group directed by Dr. Carlos de Ayala (Univ. Autónoma, Madrid), have theown new light on the history of the Military Orders in the kingdom of Castile(44). However we still do not know the real contribution -the exact quantities- of the kingdom of Castile to the eastern effort thorought the activity of the Military Orders, both national and international, in the Peninsula. We do know that, in 1271, Alfonso established Alicante and Cartagena as the seaports where all the merchandises and goods to Levant must depart from; making special reference to the Orders of the Temple and Hospital. We have already talked about the Bizantine episode, with the failed treaty between the Order of Santiago and Baldwin.That time Alfonso supported the idea of Castilian contingents in the Levant, however it seems as it would have been an isolated attempt; moreover if we take into account that all the Castilian kings showed themselves too jealous of their kingdom resources to give them away for other purposes than the Reconquest.

On the other hand, Alfonso made an unique aportation to the history of the Military Orders, because he created the first Military Order exclusively dedicated to the war in the sea against the infidels, in 1272: The Order of Santa María de España(45). Created for defensive reasons against the Berber pirates and nothern african threathen, had as its ultimate goal "el fecho allend la mar". It was instituted "ad modum Calatravae" and it was integrated by clerics, knights and other laic friars. The kingdom was divided in 4 maritime areas, controlled from 4 seaports: Cartagena (Mediterranean sea), San Sebastian (Cantabrico sea) , La Coruña (Atlantic Ocean) y Santa María del Puerto (Strait). However in 1278, the site of Algeciras led to the destruction of the Castilian fleet, and when in 1280 the Master of the Order of Santiago was completly defeated by the Moors, the king decided to fill the gaps of that Order with the members of Santa María, which involved the end of the latter.

8. Ideal and Reality of Crusade: The Castilian sources pointed out that the king must fight the Moors, as God’s servant and leader of his people. However, this fight did not look for the extinction of the Muslim as a people, but all the sources rather stressed the fight as the recovery of the lands which were, now, occupied by the Moors, and as a way of providing wealth to the Christian soldiers, as well as a means to serve God. This was one of the features of the castilian crusades which made it different from others, like the French(46). Of course, the religious difference was always present and was basic to distinguish the enemy(47), althought this enemy, usually represented as "treacherous", needed not to be completely evil. In fact the images of the Moors shown in Fernando’s chronicles and even in the Poema de Fernán González, written about 1254, are quite radical against them; and now Alfonso’s images would seem to be more tolerant: in his Seven Parts he stated that " conversion of the Moors must be through good words and rightful predications... not by force or by pression...and if some of them wanted to convert to cristianity...that nobody fear to oppose it"(48). However, the war against the infidel is always present. In his Second Part he talked about three reasons to wage war. The first one was "to increase the people’s faith and destroy those who wants to oppose it"(49). The war against the infidel must be fought for the land and to avoid the threat of conversion to Islam. Alfonso is not interested in the "problematic" of launching a crusade to favour conversion. Furthermore, in his Cantigas, the Moors are the external enemy, both political, economic and religiously(50). His Second Part also stated that those who died for God and the Faith would go to Paradise; and he added that the worse kind of prison was that suffered by Christian at infidels’ hands. In that case, there was an "obligation" to free them as soon as possible. In his Cantigas it can also be seen the decision of a total reconquest of the Peninsula and even its extension to the north of Africa. Two Cantigas also seem to justify the new method of repopulation used by Alfonso after the Mudejars’ rebellion: the total expulsion of the Muslim inhabitants of a place(51).

9. The End:The last years of Alfonso’s life saw his confrontation with France, which was a main source of worries for the papacy as it was considered a great handicap in the attempt of launching a new crusade to the East. He also witnessed his treaty with his old enemy Abu Yusuf against his own Christian son Sancho; at the same time he seems to have ordered the translation from French of the Gran Crónica de Ultramar(52), and signed his last will with the already well knwon project of a Franco-Castilian Crusade. Anyway, quite an ironic end for a king who pretended and spent most of his life acting as a "new crusader" and leader of the Christendom.

1.N Housley, The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades, 1305-1378.Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986

2. M. Parish, Chronica Maiora, ed. J.A. Giles, London, 1854: "Victorisissimus rex Castellae Audefulsus" , who had defeated the Muslims more than thirteen times, vowed to go on crusade to the Holy Land, moved by the compassion for the French debacle "thinking it more worthy to subdue the Holy Land to Christ, than any other country. (II, 387. year 1250).

3. Chronica,op.cit,supra, II,505 (1252). Jordan tells us that St, Louis admired Fernando III and the role of Spain, mainly Castile, as symbol of the Holy War. He also thinks that St. Louis neither expected any Castilian help for his crusades nor had wished that Castile had given up its struggle in the Peninsula in order to go to the Holy Land. W. Jordan, Louis IX and the challenge of the crusades. Princetown, 1979. p.30-31. cit. M. Paris, supra, ed. H. Luard, Rolls Series. London, 1876, V,311.

4. Cif. Gelsinger, " A thirteenth century Norwegian-Castilian alliance", Medievalia et Humanistica, 10 (1981),p.55-80. In 1258 and 1261 there were plans for a Norwegian help in the crusade.

5.Cif. J. González, Reinado y diplomas de Fernando III, Universidad de Córdoba, 1980. p.360. In 1259, a papal letter pointed out Alfonso "inter alios principes terres", because of his fight against the infidels (P. Linehan, La Iglesia Española y el Papado en el S.XIII, Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca, 1955. p.138)

6."...you will be aware that I am the head of the Christian community as I acknowledge that you are the head of the Mohameddian community. You also know that the (Muslim) population of Andalusia pays tribute to us and gives us gifts and we drive them before us like a herd of cattle, killing the men, widowing the women, capturing their daughters and infants, emptying their houses..." Trans. of the Chronicle of Maqrizi. Gabrieli, Storici Arabi delle crociate. Roma, 1964. Pp. 334-335, 283-284.

7. Alfonso pointed out the fame and prestige obtained by his father as God’s paladin, that made Fernando raised over the rest of the kings "because he increased His faith and exalted His saint name". As a result of that, the castilian people had raised over the rest of the Christians as well. Alfonso X, Setenario, ed. R. Lapesa, Barcelona, 1984. p. 14-16, 22.

8. Crónica Latina de los Reyes de Castilla, ed. C. Brea. Universidad de Cádiz, 1984. p. 90; J. Loaysa, Crónica de los Reyes de Castilla, ed. A, García, Murcia,1982, p.60.

9. Setenario, op. cit, supra. p.25

10. Don Juan Manuel, El libro de los Estados,ed. I. Macpherson & R. Tate, Madrid, 1991,p.205

11. Crónica Latina..., op.cit, supra, p.94

12. Poema de Fernán González, ed. A.V. Zamora, Madrid, 1978

13.Alfonso X, Crónica General de España, Madrid, 1906. col 770/2.

14.Ch. Dufourq, "Un projet castilian du XIII siecle: la "Croisade dÁfrique"", Revue d’Histoire et de Civilisation du Maghreb,1 (1966), p.31

15. 1291, treaty of Monteagudo. Aragon and Castile divided the zones of reconquest in the north of Africa. Castile got the area to the west of the river Moulauya. (Morocco)

16. The Iberian kingdoms decided to divide the reconquest of Africa among themselves. The papacy also aknowledged the leading role of the Castilian prelates and mendicant freires in the north of Africa.

17. F. Pérez-Embid, "La marina real Castellana en el S. XIII", Anuario de Estudios Medievales,6 (1969), p.141-186.

18. Bulla "Cum sicut intimantibus". Cif. Goñi Caztambide, Historia de la Bula de la Cruzada , editorial del Seminario, Vitoria, 1958. p.190. In any case, Alfonso did not seem to have been looking for that conversion; see Huici Miranda, "La Toma de Salé por la escuadra de Alfonso X el Sabio", Hesperis (1952),p. 40-71.

19. About 1279, his chronicle tells us about a Castilian plan together England and France to make such a crusade (Crónica de Alfonso X, Crónica de los Reyes de Castilla, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, Madrid, 1919. p58). And Alfonso’s first will (1283) stated the possibility to make a crusade with France ,with the same itinerary. (Memorial Histórico Español,XII, Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid, 1851). M. Paris tells us that Fernando III had already made a proposition to England for a joint crusade which would go through Spain to the north of Africa, forgetting about the French way. (Chronica...,op.cit, supra, II,439, year 1251).

20.Berger, Les registres d’Innocent IV, Paris, 1884-1897, 6112. Pothhast, Regesta Pontificia Romanorum, Berlin, 1873-1874,15855.

21. Les registres...,op.cit, supra, 6014

22. We have already seen the previous plan of 1251. Appart from this crusade and the marriage of Edward to Eleonor of Castile, different privileges for English pilgrims to Santiago were also agreed. Chronica M...,op. cit, supra, III, 8, 3-4 (year 1254). In 1255, Henry refused to participate in the crusade arguing the papal refusal to commute his vow.

23.Memorial...,op. cit, supra,I,156.

24.1257, conquest of "Tagunt". Memorial...,op.cit, supra, I, 137.

25.In 1259,cif. Linehan, supra,p.138. In this letter, the pope asked Alfonso why he maintained a treaty with the king of Granada.

26. "because of that we have (Alfonso) to carry on with the crusade beyond the sea, at God’s service and prising of the Christendom"

27. See: Historia de ...,op.cit, supra,p. 187-191; C. de Ayala Martínez, Directrices fundamentales de la política peninsular de Alfonso X, CSIC, Madrid, 1988; A. Ballesteros, "La toma de Salé en tiempos de Alfonso X", al-Andalus, VIII (1943), p.89-128; "UN project..."op.cit, supra,;"La marina...",op.cit,, supra;, "La toma de Salé por la...", op.cit, supra; M. Marin Buenadicha, "Una contradicción histórica: el suceso de Salé", Alfonso X, Vida, obra y época. Actas congreso SEM. Madrid, 1984.

28."Una contradicción...", op.cit,p.

29.M. Gual de Torrella, "Milicias Cristianas en Berbería", Boletín de la Sociedad arqueológica Luliana, XXXIV (1973),p.34-63

30. In 1265, the pope also granted Alfonso crusading indulgences and benefices for his fight against the rebels.

31. J. Torres Fontes, "La Orden de Santa María de España", Miscelánea Medieval Murciana, III (1977),p.73-118

32.Chronica M..., op. cit, supra, I,117. Letter from Frederick II to Richard.

33. Loaysa said that Alfonso had knighted a great number of nobles, among them: Prince Edward of England, Philip de Courtneay, Prince D. Dionis of Portugal; Mohammad Alhamar I, king of Granada; the king’s brothers D. Fernando, D.Manuel, D. Fernando de Ponthieu and D. Luis; John and Louis de Brienne; John, marquis de Montferrand (in fact, he was Gillerm VI, married to Alfonso’s daughter Beatriz); Gaston de Bearn (Gaston VIII de Moncada, vizcount of Bearn, also figures as Guy VI, vizcount of Limoges and king’s vassal since 1253); and the count Rodolf of Haubsburgo. Crónica Latina...,op. cit, supra.p.82

34. C. de Ayala, op. cit, supra.; C. Julio Socarras, Alfonso X of Castile: a study on Imperialistic frustration, Barcelona, 1976.

35. In 1245 there were contacts between Baldwin II and the Spanish Military Order of Santiago, supervised by Alfonso. But these contacts were previous to Alfonso’s interest in the Empire. B. Ruano, "Balduino II de Constantinopla y la Orden de Santiago", Hispania,XII (1952),p. 3-36.

36. R. Wolff, "Mortage and redemption of an Emperor’s son: Castile and the Latin empire of Constantinople", Speculum, 29 (1956), p.45-84

37. C. de Ayala, supra.

38. P. Martínez, "Relaciones de Alfonso x con el sultán Mameluco Baybars y sus sucesores", Al-Qantara, 27 (1962), p. 343-376.

39. M. Milá y Fontanals, De los Trovadores en España. Obras

40. La Iglesia Española... ,op.cit, supra, p.110

4. In 1265, the pope granted helps for the fight against the Mudejar revolt. Meanwhile, the Aragonese church had to face new petitions from Rome for new taxes for the Levant.

42.Crónica Latina..., op. cit, suprta, p. 37 & 75; R. Jiménez de Rada, Historia rebus Hispaniae, Madrid, Alianza Universidad, 1989. p. 307

43.C. de Ayala Martínez, "La Monarquía y la Ordenes Militares durante el reinado de Alfonso X", Hispania, 178 (1972)., p.409-465.

44. Works on the Orders of Santiago, Alcántara, Calatrava and St. John.

45."La Orden de Santa María...", op.cit, supra

46. Just remember the different attitude towards the Moors shown by Castilian and French crusaders in Las Navas, 1212.

47. "The king of Granada is enemy of God, and enemy of the faith, and of the king [Alfonso] and all his people".Crónica de Alfonso X, op.cit,supra, p.25

48.Alfonso X,Las Siete Partidas, Salamanca, 1555. Part. VII, tit.XXV

49.Las Siete...,op.cit, supra. Part. II

50.M. García Arenal, "Los Moros en las Cantigas de Alfonso X el Sabio", Al-Qantara,5(1985), p. 133-151

51."Los Moros en las Cantigas ...", op.cit, supra.

52.C. González, La tercera crónica de Alfonso X: "La Gran Crónica de Ultramar", London, 1992

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