Ideas, preferences and institutions: 
Explaining the Europeanization of Spanish Foreign Policy 

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Presentation 

Though the literature on Europeanization rarely addresses issues related to the impact of EU membership on member states’ foreign policies, I will show in this paper that, in fact, EU membership has left a very visible imprint on Spanish foreign policy. Changes in Spanish foreign policy are part of the wider process of political, economic and social modernization which the country set in motion after Franco’s death in 1975. Yet, this paper shows, it is EU membership, not the transition to democracy, which ultimately explains these changes. 

Changes at the policy level have been of two types, policy convergence and policy transfer and have responded to different logics and motivations. Whereas the major force behind policy convergence has been the search for recognition as a full and loyal member of the Western democratic community of nations, the rationale of policy transfer has been to take advantage of EU membership to promote very specific national interests in Latin America and the Mediterranean. In both cases, existing European foreign policy-making institutions have been decisive to structure not only preferences, but also outcomes. European institutions, I will show, have not been neutral: whereas they have facilitated Spanish Socialists realization of their identities, they have tied conservatives to Europe much further or in different ways than these would have wanted. 

The ultimate impact of European institutions on domestic policies has however depended on
domestic factors. Varying patterns of Europeanization, I will show in this paper, can be explained by looking at the set of beliefs about Europe held by different policy-makers. In the Socialist case (1982-1996), the set of beliefs about Europe resonated particularly well with existing European foreign policy institutions and practices and thus enhanced each other. In the conservative government case (1996 to-date), dissonance dominated and tensions between national goals and European institutions spread. In the first case, Europeanization at the domestic level activated a process of further institutionalization at the European level, whereas in the second case, the positive relationship between Europeanization and institutionalization was broken or severely mitigated.

This paper is divided into five sections. In the first, I briefly review the literature on Europeanization and justify the research design. In the second and third sections, I describe the impact of EU membership on Spanish foreign policy in its two most important dimensions (policy convergence and policy transfer). Then, in the fourth section, I look at the process of European integration and the development of the EPC/CSFP), assess the mechanisms through which the EPC/CSFP exerts its impact on policy outcomes and address the problem of explaining variation in outcomes. In the fifth section, I examine the Spanish Socialists and conservatives’ ideas about Europe, and argue in favor of using European identities as the intervening variable explaining the changing nature and intensity of Europeanization in the Spanish case. I then conclude with some theoretical observations about the role of ideas and institutions in shaping actors’ preferences and strategies as well as on the power of identities to explain variation in Europeanization patterns across and within countries.

1. Europeanization and foreign policy change

Starting with Ladrech’s (1994) article on France, Europeanisation has become the buzz word for everything related with the impact of the European integration process on its member states (and even on non-members), be it at the level of policies, politics, identities or societies. Such a broad definition of the concept has made theorizing about Europeanisation difficult and scholars have therefore opted for an inductive approach, in which case or country studies have been used to develop the analytical tools needed to understand how this process of Europeanization operates (Caporaso, Cowles and Risse 1998, Bomberg and Peterson 2000, Knill and Lemkuhl 1999).
However, though this pragmatic approach is well-justified, it also entails significant risks: as it has been pointed out (Goetz 2000), an excessively narrow focus may end up producing evidence which is either scarcely relevant (the typical “there is impact” conclusion) or difficult to generalize (when assumptions and tools are too *ad hoc* as to fit anything other than the particular case study). So far, one of the best guarantees of being on the “right track” has been the adoption of an institutionalist or, rather, a “neoinstitutionalist” perspective. This has made it possible to set up research designs which aim at testing the hypotheses about institutions, preferences and outcomes posed by the rational, historical or sociological variants of the new institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996, Hall and Taylor 1998, Hay and Wincott 1998), as well as to probe deeper into the impact of European integration on the domestic institutional structures in which each country’s European preferences are formed (Aspinwall and Schneider 1999, Boerzel and Risse 2000, Caporaso, Cowles and Risse 1998). Following this approach, we can define Europeanization as the process of change at the domestic level (be it of policies, preferences or institutions) originated by the adaptation pressures generated by the European integration process; a process of change whose intensity and character depend on the “goodness of fit” of domestic institutions and adaptation pressures (Caporaso, Cowles and Risse 1998).

Turning to particular policies, it is remarkable that, with the exception of Smith (1988, 2000), cases related to EU foreign policy have not figured high in the research agenda of Europeanization. As the editors of a recent volume on the topic concluded, the weak institutionalization and strong intergovernmental character of EPC/CSFP presupposes a “limited impact on domestic policy choices” (Hix and Goetz 2000: 6).

The persistence of this very narrow understanding of the EU’s foreign policy institutions contrasts vividly with existing theoretical and empirical knowledge. On the one hand, regime theory (Krasner 1983) has built almost all of its conceptualization on how institutions shape and constrain states’ preferences precisely on evidence drawn from intergovernmental arrangements, very rarely from supranational arrangements such as the EC/EU, which are rather exceptional. In the particular case of the EU, analyses of the functioning of the Council of Ministers have often showed that its intergovernmental nature has not prevented the emergence of a distinct decision-making culture and the consolidation of standards of appropriate behavior which reveal how institutions affect and
can even transform actors’ preferences (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997, Lewis 2000). However, except for a few studies highlighting the “unadverted revolution” which European diplomacy was undergoing (Hill and Wallace 1996, Smith 2000), there have been no subsequent efforts to translate the hypotheses of sociological institutionalism into case studies of EPC/CSFP.

On the other hand, there is enough empirical evidence on the EPC/CFSP to justify the application of this notion of “Europeanization” to this particular policy field. We know, for example, that the EPC started out as a mere arena, then institutionalized its procedures and finally underwent a process of “constitutionalization” (Dehousse and Weiler 1991, Holland 1991, Holland 1993, Joergensen 1993, Smith 1996, Smith 1998). As Smith (2000: 614) has observed, there is enough evidence concerning the fact that “prolonged participation in the CFSP feeds back into EU member states and reorients their foreign policy cultures along similar lines”. To others, EPC/CFSP’s “logic of integration” (Ginsberg 1989: 9) would have transformed the attitudes and beliefs of its participants (Nuttall 1992) and favored a substantial convergence of member states’ policies in some policy areas (Rummel 1992, Holland 1995, Hill and Wallace 1996).

Yet, even though the link between Europeanization, the EPC/CFSP and the new institutionalism has now been successfully established, much remains to be done. Smith (2000: 614) has focused on clarifying both the independent variable, i.e. “what particular aspects of EPC/CFSP cause sympathetic changes in national foreign policy structures”, and the dependent variable, i.e. “what are the specific indicators of this change”. I suggest that this approach should be complemented by national case studies which, in line with recent suggestions (Boerzel and Risse 2000, Goetz 2000), help us to explain variation, i.e. why similar pressures produce different result in different countries or, within the same countries, why there is variation across different time-periods.

In the Spanish case, I will argue that the major process of Europeanization which has affected fundamental areas of the country’s foreign policy (both in terms of policy convergence and policy transfer) requires a combination of explanations and perspectives. On the one hand, the EU has provided an excellent opportunity to enhance the foreign policy capacity and the national goals of a country which had a large and problematic foreign policy agenda, scant economic resources to
match ambitions with policies, little international prestige, and a weak foreign service. Therefore, the logic of consequentiality typical of the rationalist perspective should apply. On the other hand, however, foreign policy has been dominated by issues of legitimacy and identity, which have been quite apparent in the wish of both the Spanish Socialist and conservative governments to be recognized as equals by their European and Atlantic partners, and also by their own electorates, behavior which is therefore determined by the logic of appropriateness typical of the sociological perspective (March and Olsen 1989).

As it has been pointed out, the “missing link” between the adaptation pressures stemming from the European integration process and the changes these pressures trigger in the domestic realm is yet to be uncovered (Goetz 2000: 222). Evidence presented here concerning the Europeanization of Spanish foreign policy supports the view that rationalist institutionalism cannot fully explain this link. While much still remains to be done regarding the rationalist incorporation of ideas (Yee 1997), I will argue in this paper, the need to combine explanations based on the parallel explanatory power of instrumental interests and ideas or beliefs about Europe has become unavoidable.

2. Seeking recognition and acceptance

Fifteen years of EU membership (1986-2001) have left a visible imprint on Spanish foreign policy. In those policy areas in which Spanish foreign policy traditionally deviated most from the European standard, we have seen a remarkable process of policy convergence.

While the Franco regime (1939-1975) encouraged Spaniards to feel proud of being different from other (liberal and secular) West European countries, Spanish democratic elites would do their utmost to convince their European counterparts that Spain should be seen as a normal Western democracy and hence a fully reliable partner. Much as it has happened in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989, when Franco died in 1975 and democracy was established, a process of “return to the West” was set in motion. Successive Spanish governments abandoned or distanced themselves from those policies and relations which they thought gave Spanish foreign policy a “Third World” perspective, adopting those policies which they thought would best serve their wish
to see Spain recognized and admitted as a full member of the Western community. The two major milestones in this process, NATO and EU membership, were reached in 1981 and 1986, respectively.

Observers tend to see NATO and EU membership as a logical side-product of Spanish democratic transition (Maxwell and Spiegel 1994). Apparently, the path followed by Spanish foreign policy after democratization conforms to the observations of the literature on domestic liberalization and foreign policy change (Kahler 1997), which posits that domestic democratic institutions and market-oriented reforms both require and result in multilateralism. However, the impact of democratization should not be overstated: a decade after Franco’s death, analysts like Pollack (1987) concluded that Spain’s transition to democracy had not introduced any significant change in the country’s international orientation. The same holds true with respect to the impact of EU membership: as the case of Greece proves, democratization and EU membership can be compatible with the maintenance of a nationalistic foreign policy discourse (and practice). This view was widely shared in EPC circles in the beginning of the eighties where concern was expressed that Spain, just like Greece, might become another enfant terrible for European foreign policy cooperation (Barbé 1996b).

Looking back, it is difficult to see which alternative international options would have made sense for a country such as Spain, emerging from almost forty years of isolation and logically wishing to shake off its pariah status. However, the case of Spain is a case against determinism: things could have been different (an assertion which also holds true for Portugal). Alternative options did indeed exist and were considered during the early years of Spanish democracy by both the conservatives, who were still very nationalistic and did not share the finalité politique of the European integration process, and the Socialists, who were quite uncomfortable both with the market-oriented nature of the EEC project and with Spanish alignment with the United States in the Cold War (Holmes 1983: 165). Therefore, while both the conservatives and the Socialists wanted to put an end to Spanish international isolation, this was seen by the conservatives as compatible with retaining sovereignty and by the Socialists as compatible with neutrality and a strong public sector (Álvarez-Miranda 1996).
It is true that one of the first decisions of Prime Minister Suárez (1977-1981) was to apply for EU membership (the application was staged in 1977, the Commission issued its favorable avis in 1978 and negotiations started in 1979) but, in general terms, his foreign policy brought little or no change when it came to the more traditional dimensions of Franco’s foreign relations: no diplomatic relations with Israel, Arab friendship, rhetoric about Latin American brotherhood, privileged relations with Castro’s Cuba, a purely pragmatic relationship with the United States and the attendance to the Conference of Non-Aligned countries in Havana in 1979 (Armero 1989, Grugel 1995: 189). Leaving aside NATO membership in 1981, changes in Spanish foreign policy and the full recovering of Spanish prestige and role in international affairs would have to wait for the Socialists’ accession to power in October 1982, and Spain’s accession to the European Community, in 1986. [3]

The picture was very different in 1996, ten years after EU membership, when the Socialist government of Prime Minister González was replaced by conservative Aznar. Spain’s foreign policy had suffered a radical transformation: a country that had not participated in either of the century’s world wars and which had not been a founding member of the United Nations was now a full member of the international, Western and European community. The country was now an influential member of NATO and the EU and Spanish troops, having been seen fighting abroad (or rather, being defeated) only in colonial wars in the last hundred years (Cuba, Philippines and Morocco) had participated in the Gulf War, and were or had been deployed in twelve peacekeeping operations in places as far apart as the former Yugoslavia, Central America and the South African region (Barbé 1996b: 124). Disproving those who had argued that Spain’s Latin American or Mediterranean dimension would prevent it from acting as a truly Western country, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Javier Solana (1991-1995), was first appointed NATO’s Secretary General and then CFSP High Representative, while Prime Minister González (1983-1996) on various occasions rejected offers to head the European Commission, a clear tribute to the global vision shown by both during their time in office. Other Spaniards also obtained prominent positions in EU foreign policy: former Foreign Minister Carlos Westendorp (1995-1996) as the EU High Representative in Bosnia, the Major of Valencia, Ricardo Pérez-Casado, as Administrator of Mostar and career diplomat Miguel A. Moratinos as EU special envoy to the Middle East.

The profound transformation of Spanish foreign policy was possibly best exemplified by the convening of the 1991 Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid. The fact that the Israeli
government agreed to Madrid hosting the meeting was remarkable given that Spain and Israel did not maintain diplomatic relations prior to 1986, the historic affinities of General Franco with the Arab world, and even King Juan Carlos’s excellent personal relationships with King Hussein and the Saudi Royal Family. But the most remarkable event of democratic Spain’s foreign policy was the Spanish Socialists’ U-turn over NATO and neutrality, a move which was intimately linked to EU membership.

The Cold War had allowed General Franco to transform the fascist façade of a regime born with Hitler and Mussolini’s military support into that of an “authoritarian” anti-communist crusader. But in contrast to Salazar’s Portugal, which was a founding member of NATO, Spain had only a bilateral military treaty with the US (1953) by which Spain exchanged military aid for the permanent deployment of American troops and nuclear armament on its territory. Spain was therefore a second-class member of the Western bloc: it contributed to the contention of the Soviet Union but had no say in Western security policies — the treaty with the US did not even cover military assistance to Spain in the event of a conflict with its major rival, Morocco.

Once Franco died (1975) and democracy was established, the country had two options: it could upgrade its security status and become a full member of NATO, or refuse to renew the treaty with the US and adopt a neutralist position. Suárez (1976-1981) hesitated to adopt either of the two options: clearly, the bilateral military treaty with the US was unacceptable to a fully sovereign democratic country, but at a moment when détente was over and superpower tension was steadily increasing, neither becoming a member of NATO nor adopting neutrality would contribute to ease those tensions, a view which was shared by the Socialists’ main foreign policy analyst, Fernando Morán (1980), who was to become Foreign Affairs Minister of the González Socialist government in 1982. [4]

If the country finally moved ahead and became a member of NATO, it was because President Suárez’s lack of authority over his party forced him to resign and his replacement, Calvo-Sotelo (1981-1982), who had previously been minister in charge of relations with the EU, firmly believed that NATO represented the community of free and democratic nations to which Spain should belong if it wanted to be considered as a normal and modern Western democracy. Calvo-Sotelo
knew that popular support for NATO membership was non-existent and was well aware of the fact that González’s Socialists, who were highly likely to win a landslide parliamentary majority in the next elections, firmly opposed NATO membership and had announced a referendum to pull the country out of NATO if they won office. However, it was evident that withdrawing from NATO would be much costlier than simply not joining. Thus, despite accusations that his decision was not very democratic or legitimate, the country became a member of NATO in 1981.

Calvo-Sotelo proved right. When the Socialists gained office in 1982, González first postponed the referendum and, when he finally convoked it in 1986, it was to ask citizens to ratify Spanish presence in NATO, not to withdraw from it. Had the EU anything to do with this U-turn? Though the Socialist government tried on numerous occasions to present to public opinion NATO as another cost of EU membership, the Socialist foreign minister of the time insists that this was just merely a tactic to help secure a yes-vote in the 1986 referendum. The Spanish government, he recalls, never received any direct pressure or indication suggesting that staying in NATO would facilitate EC membership (Morán 1990: 311).

But the fact that the government did not come under direct pressure on this matter does not mean that this same government should not have clearly perceived that withdrawing from NATO in any of the years between 1983 and 1985 would have meant a severe blow to the organization. NATO’s strategy of facing up to the Soviet challenge in Afghanistan and Poland with the deployment of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) was being severely questioned in the streets by many European citizens, and even by some West European governments, who were wary of Reagan and Thatcher’s aggressiveness towards the Soviet Union. Weakening NATO, provoking trans-Atlantic divisions and conceding a great propaganda victory to the Soviet Union was not the best way to back Spain’s attempts to be considered a standard Western democracy in the eyes of its EU partners, which, with the exception of Ireland, were all members of NATO.

Following these considerations, and to the surprise of Spanish public opinion, his European colleagues, and even his foreign minister, who was not warned beforehand of this change, González emerged out of his first meeting with Chancellor Kohl in October 1983 declaring his support for the deployment of the Cruise and Pershing II nuclear missiles. Then, in 1985, González
presented the Parliament with a ten-point security policy which included remaining in NATO, though out of the military structure, and the promotion of European foreign and security capabilities.

Had the international game been a white blackboard in which Spain could start from scratch, the Spanish Socialists would have probably opted for being neutral. Actually, during the seventies, Spanish Socialists were very much influenced by the Swedish model and Olof Palme and neutralism was their first option. But González’s U-turn with respect to NATO was not the outcome of negotiations held between the Spanish government with either the US or its European allies and cannot therefore be explained by rationalist accounts of international politics. Rather, it was the product of the Spanish Socialists’ socialization among the Western governments: approaching NATO and the EU triggered a process of learning which, at least in the case of González, resulted in a clear change of preferences (Marks 1997) — foreign minister Morán did not follow González’s change and was ousted from government in 1985. [5]

Once Spain became a member of the EU in 1986, Spanish foreign and security policy continued its process of Europeanization. After the NATO referendum was held and won, the government further emphasized the European dimension of its security policy with important symbolic and practical gestures: it became a member of the WEU and subsequently was involved in the Gulf War by participating with three frigates in the WEU’s naval force in the Persian Gulf, it participated as an observer in the 1986 Franco-German brigade and continuously supported and actively contributed to the strengthening of Europe’s international identity and action-capacity, specially in the security (participation in the Eurocorps and Euromarfor) and industry fields (Eurofighter project), but also at the citizen level, as exemplified by the proposals on diplomatic representation and consular protection for EU citizens abroad (Coates 2000: 182-6, Ortega 1995: 246-7).

All this showed that to the extent to which the Spanish Socialists abandoned their neutralist preferences and decided to stay in NATO, they did so because they understood that NATO membership could facilitate Spain’s pushing for an European defense identity. In other words, at a time when Spanish socialists disliked both neutrality and Atlantism, EU membership provided an
alternative security policy, i.e. Europeanization, which was fully coherent with the Socialists’ interpretations of Spanish needs and interests. A synergistic combination of Europeanization and Europeification was thus unleashed.

Spanish participation in the EPC framework facilitated this process: it proved decisive to socialize Spanish diplomats in the habits of coordination and consensus-seeking and to have Spanish policies gradually converge with those of the other member states. Spain and Portugal, as would-be members of the EU, had already been associated in 1982 to the EPC process so that prior to their accession to the EC, they enjoyed a superior status in EPC to that assigned to Norway, Canada, Turkey or the US, with ministerial meetings with EPC Troika taking place twice a year and meetings of Political Directors four times a year (EFPB 85/041). The result of this process of association was impressive in terms of foreign policy convergence: as the Report of the Luxembourg Presidency to the European Parliament on the functioning of the EPC highlighted, even before Spain had become a formal member, the Ten, together with Spain and Portugal, had adopted common positions on a wide range of issues relating to the Middle East (with Spain’s adherence to the 1980 Venice Declaration and its announcement of the imminent establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel), apartheid’s South Africa (respect for the Code of Conduct to be followed by European firms in trading with South Africa), the San José Dialogue in Central America, and East-West relations (EFPB 85/318).

Once member, the Socialist government showed true enthusiasm about EC foreign policy cooperation: already in its first year of EPC membership, Spanish diplomacy became the third producer of COREU telexes (Barbé 1995: 162-3). Also, in a bid to further reaffirm its wish to be considered a normal and reliable partner, the government accepted the challenge of presiding the EU in the first semester of 1989, a challenge which Portugal refused. This need for recognition translated into an agenda in which, in contrast to the 1995 Presidency, European interests were placed in the agenda well above national interests (Closa 1995, EFPB 89/12, 89/126, 89/178).

The result was that in 1996, ten years after EU membership, when the Socialists left office to be replaced by the conservative Peoples’ Party (PP), Spanish foreign policy had acquired a clear EU profile: all the positions Spain had adopted in areas such disarmament and non-proliferation,
multilateral trade and investment, international financial cooperation, human rights and democratization, peace-keeping or global warming, could only be understood in the framework of Spanish membership of the EU. Clearly, in all these matters, Spanish preferences and interests’ perception were pre-determined by its participation in the EU.

3. The Europeanization of national interests

Besides policy convergence, the other side of this process of Europeanization has been a remarkable degree of policy transfer from Spain to the EU. [6] Very clearly, Spain has “exported” parts of its own foreign policy agenda and subsequently managed to have the EU adopt policies on areas, such as Latin America or the Mediterranean, in which the EU had minor or marginal interests of its own. In the case of Latin America, Spanish governments have used the EU to increase the international status of Spain as spokesman of the Spanish-speaking world. In the case of the Mediterranean, Spain has used the EU to dilute its bilateral relation with Morocco (traditionally plagued by tensions and security problems) into a relation consisting of multiple and interdependent layers of interests which forms part of a wider European policy towards the Mediterranean which Spain has substantially contributed to create (Barbé 1995: 168-9, Gillespie 1995: 226).

Spanish membership of the EU has added to or substantially strengthened the Latin American and Mediterranean profile of European foreign policy. In fact, whereas many EU member states had post-colonial relations at the time of their accession to the EU, the principal dimension of the majority of EU members’ foreign policy was Europe or the Atlantic, thus making it easier for them to fit into the EPC/CFSP machinery (Hill and Wallace 1996). The case of Spain is, therefore, only comparable to that of the United Kingdom and France, who have had to make EU membership compatible with their belonging to, leadership of, and commitment to, another sort of “community” — it is no coincidence that Spanish rhetoric refers to Latin America as the “Iberoamerican community of nations”.

The question of how Spain should deal with its Latin American dimension and the role which the EU should play in this was however a controversial matter within the first Socialist government
(1982-1986). Whereas foreign minister Morán believed that building a special relationship with Latin America outside the EU would increase Spain’s autonomy in international affairs and boost its value to the EU and the US, prime minister González and Morán’s successor in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Fernández Ordóñez (1985-1992) opted to align first Spanish relations with the region with those of other EC member states, i.e. Europeanizing, and then seek the leadership of the management of relations between the EC and Latin America (Grugel 1995: 191).

Spain’s strategy of turning the EU into an amplifier of its national interests in Latin America was already visible during the negotiation of the accession treaty. There, Spain obtained a declaration stating the commitment of the EC to help Spain make its accession compatible with the maintaining and promotion of its national interests in Latin America (EFPB 86/184). Later, in the first European Council meeting which Spain attended (The Hague, June 1986), the Twelve asked the Commission to prepare a strategy to upgrade EU relations with Latin America. The strategy, consisting mostly of an increase in EU development aid, the coordination of EU member states’ development policies towards the region, the promotion of regional integration and trade exchanges and the support of peace-processes, was subsequently presented to the Twelve and endorsed one year later at the European Council meeting in Brussels (EFPB 87/227). This strategy was successively updated, culminating in 1995, during the second Spanish Presidency of the EU, in a new strategy which included the signing of association or free trade agreements with the most developed countries in the region (the Mercosur group and Mexico), the opening up of EU markets to the Andean and Central American countries through the EU system of trade preferences (GSP) and a substantial increase in official development aid to the countries members of the ACP Conventions (EFPB 95/402).

Despite the risks which Spain has assumed in its relations with Latin America and the obvious limits of the EU member states’ interest in Latin America (Grugel 1995, Youngs 2000), Spain has succeeded in tying the EU to Latin America and, at the same time, completely transforming the outlook of its relations with the region. Whereas in the early eighties, Spain was still a recipient of official development aid (ODA), and thus was unable to contribute to Latin America development, in 2000 Spain was able to contribute to OECD countries development aid with $1.4 billion — a figure which accounted for less than 0.25% of its GDP but much of which was targeted at Latin America. Equally, whereas Spain had long been a major recipient of foreign direct investment (ranking eleventh in the world in 1999), in a short period of time, it became the major foreign
investor in Latin America, ahead of the US. This economic presence, together with the prestige it gained from both its role as Latin American spokesman in the EU, its cultural and linguistic ties with the region, and the example of Spain’s successful transition to democracy (Wiarda 1987: 174), have brought Spain closer to being a global player with global responsibilities. [8]

EU membership has allowed Spain to initiate a similar process of upgrading in its relations with Morocco and the Mediterranean. In this case, however, the pervading security dimension and the fact that culture has been more of an obstacle than a facilitator should lead us to speak of a problem transfer rather than just of policy transfer, and to point out that success has also been limited and rather fragile. Beyond the colonial past, itself the origin of many ongoing barriers, Spain’s bilateral relations with Morocco prior to Spanish accession to the EU were dominated, first, by the territorial claim by Morocco on the two Spanish enclaves in the northern coast of Morocco (Ceuta and Melilla), second, by the constant incidents between the Spanish fishing fleet and the Moroccan navy over fishing rights and territorial limits and, third, by the pending issue of the Western Sahara, in which Spanish sympathies lay with the Saharan people more than with the Moroccan government. In this context, Spain’s only (limited and dangerous) instrument to deal with Morocco was to manipulate Algerian-Morocco rivalries. Relations were therefore presided over by tensions, sporadically heightened by Moroccan verbal threats against the Spanish enclaves and incidents at sea between Spanish fishermen and the Moroccan navy. All this made Morocco, not the Cold War, the Spanish army’s principal conflict scenario (Morán 1980).

EU membership allowed Spain to transform some of these problems and create a web of interdependence, the result of which was impressive. As a result of EU membership, first, and the definition of an overall EU strategy towards the Mediterranean, later on (EFPB 95/204, 95/327), fisheries started to be managed by Brussels and progressively dealt with in a global package (the Euro-Mediterranean association strategy), which included market access issues, development aid and technical cooperation. The increase in trade and foreign investment flows across the Strait contributed to the transformation of the military fortress outlook of the two Spanish enclaves in the northern coast of Morocco into major gates to trade and all sort of exchanges — including those, such as drugs or illegal migration, whose solution most typically requires increased cooperation. Finally, EU membership allowed Spain’s preference for a referendum on the future of the Western Sahara to be considered as a proof of Spain’s alignment with the international community on the
matter, rather than an attempt to destabilize Morocco (Barbé 1996b: 122). The marked improvement of Spanish-Moroccan relations in which EU membership resulted had another important dimension: the Euro-Mediterranean strategy which Spain promoted, with its emphasis on the containment of Islamic fundamentalism and the support of moderate Arab governments, contributed to put aside EU human rights and democratic conditionality concerns and thus became a decisive element in assuring the viability of the Monarchy of Hassan II.

The evidence presented so far could easily lead the reader to question whether there has really been any “Europeanization” of Spanish foreign policy with respect to Latin America or the Mediterranean. Yet, there has been Europeanization, because having the EU serve Spain’s national interests has had important consequences for both Spain and the European Union. Whereas policy convergence (the first dimension of Europeanization analyzed in this paper) had been the result of Spain’s wish to adapt to the European standard in some given issues so as to gain recognition, here, it should be noted, Europeanization has been both a prerequisite for, and the unintended result of, having the EU serve Spain’s national interests. Let us consider these two elements in a little more detail.

Obviously, Spain could not impose its national interests and policies on the EU without changes or adaptations. Even if it could negotiate this policy transfer, and exchange it for its support for other member states’ policy areas, success could only be based on persuading the other EU members that the EU had a distinct interest in the matter and, therefore, of the need for the EU to have a policy of its own. Therefore, much as it Spain did with the Cohesion Fund, rather than a negotiation, what Spain offered was a justification for action in terms of “European”, not just Spanish national interests. [9]

In the case of Latin America, this justification was based on the economic benefits the EU would obtain from increased trade and investment flows, but had also to do with the satisfaction of offering some Latin American countries a counterbalance to US influence in the region. In contrast, in the Mediterranean, justifications for EU action were based more on the need to address and manage negative interdependencies such as the need to solve the Middle East conflict, the population boom, the welfare gap, the problem of Islamic fundamentalism, the issue of human
rights and democratization, inter-state rivalries and tensions, and drug trafficking and illegal migration (Nuñez 2000: 130-3).

In both cases, the success of Spanish strategies towards Latin America and the Mediterranean required a strengthening of the EU’s overall foreign policy capacity and the increase of the so-called “consistency” of EPC/CFSP actions and procedures in pillar II with trade, cooperation and development policies in the Community pillar. However, whereas the former were decided by with unanimity, the later needed only qualified majority. This meant that the Spanish governments would be forced to negotiate Spain’s purest bilateral interests with their EU counterparts under majority voting rules. The obvious risk was that, even if the European standard perfectly coincided with Spain’s national interest, policy would develop its own inertia and it would prove very difficult to change even at Spain’s will.

This loss of autonomy can be illustrated by two examples. The first concerns Castro’s Cuba. There, the Spanish Socialist government (1982-1996) had the EU develop a policy which served Spanish interests very well: it combined EU protection for Spanish firms in Cuba against the Helms-Burton Act with a strategy of “carrots” towards the Castro’s regime to induce him to liberalize the regime. Through this strategy, Spanish firms reaped the material benefits of Castro’s economic reforms, Spain distinguished itself in Latin American eyes from US’ aggressiveness, at the same time as it advanced its own model of a consensual transition to democracy as the solution to Cuba’s future. The strategy did not work or, rather, it worked only for Spanish firms, but when President Aznar came to power in 1996 and allied with the Cuban exiles in Miami to turn “carrots” into “sticks” and have the EU adopt more severe policies towards Castro, he found out that his government had very little room for maneuver. Spanish and European firms had invested heavily in Cuba’s tourism sector and were not willing to risk retaliations by Castro. Also, the Helms-Burton Act and the threats of US Congress on European firms had considerably hardened EU willingness to dialogue with the US on matters related with Cuba. Therefore, despite EU policy towards Cuba being almost 100% Spanish in origin, Spain was not subsequently able to change it and Aznar had to abandon his idea of using the EU to put pressure on Castro to democratize.

As already noted, in the case of Morocco, Spain had been very successful in building a tight web...
of economic interests which contributed to dilute the security and diplomatic problems which had traditionally haunted Spanish-Moroccan relations. Spanish vessels represented 92% of the EU tonnage operating in Morocco, but the Commission negotiated and managed the fisheries agreement and the Community budget financed the “renting” of Moroccan waters to Spanish vessels. This spared Spain a lot of diplomatic tensions and enabled it to obtain a better fisheries agreement that it would otherwise have secured on a bilateral basis. However, when the last fisheries agreement expired (1995-1999), Morocco refused to renew it unless the EU substantially increased the financial compensations or, alternatively, unless the EU financed the restructuring of the Moroccan fishing fleet and industry so that Moroccan vessels could do the fishing and unload the catch in Moroccan, not Spanish, harbors for its processing and exporting to the EU. Spain was of course opposed to the second solution because it would mean some 4,000 direct and 12,000 indirect job losses, but the EU could not accept the first proposal, to increase the financial compensation, because that would set a negative precedent for all the countries with which the EU had fishing agreements. The agreement was thus not renewed and the Spanish government was obviously not allowed to seek a bilateral solution with Morocco. The story of Spain’s loss of autonomy of its bilateral relations with Morocco as a result of Europeanization became evident, it was extensively quoted in the press and provoked some very heated parliamentary debates. [10]

To conclude, let me briefly mention two issues which clearly show the impact of EU membership on Spanish foreign policy and, more particularly, the constraining effects of Europeanization. The first is Eastern enlargement. Here, the literature has stressed how EU membership and the sharing of a common identity has been decisive to tame, if not completely eliminate, the natural opposition which according to rationalist accounts of international politics we should expect from some countries, and even from the EU as a whole (Sedelmeier 2001 , Friis 1998, Schimmelfennig 1999) . Though the terms in which the debate on this question has been posed is arguable, [11] it is evident that enlargement proves how participation in the EU policy-making process shapes and constrains the member states’ views on a variety of policy issues. As it has been argued (Sjursen 1998: 13) , enlargement may be ultimately incompatible with the construction of an European foreign policy identity on which Spanish governments have invested so much (not to mention the financial or institutional impact). Yet, Spain has to support the process of enlargement.

The second issue related with Gibraltar (or the “Rock”, in British terminology), the enclave under
British control in the Gibraltar Strait which deprives Spain of control over its most fundamental strategic asset. After Spain was defeated in war by the British, the Utrecht Treaty of 1713 ceded the use of the territory to the British, while the sovereignty was assumed to remain Spanish. Contrary to the case of Hong Kong, the treaty had no expiry date and therefore the problem persists today in ways which make its resolution very difficult (London respects the desire of the habitants of the Gibraltar to remain attached to the UK and Madrid uses the sovereignty clause of the Utrecht Treaty to deny any claim to self-determination). Whereas the issue ranked high in Franco’s nationalistic rhetoric, rallies-around-the-flag periodically used by his regime to gather domestic support, subsequent Spanish democratic governments have always minimized the issue, never conditioned British-Spanish relations on the solution of the problem, and hoped that democracy and European integration would make it easier for both the UK and the people of Gibraltar to return the territory to Spain. However, the effect of EU membership and the Single Market regulations on the free movement of capital, goods, services and persons, has been precisely the opposite: though it has lowered the cost of returning to Spain, it has lowered even further the cost of the status quo.

4. **Pressures for change, goodness of fit and degrees of adaptation**

Four assumptions have traditionally dominated the field of studies of European foreign policy. First, an exclusive focus on the intergovernmental level, i.e. EPC/CFSP activities, and the ensuing neglect of the foreign policy importance of the supranational level, i.e. EU external economic relations. Second, the assumption that EPC/CFSP was just a voluntary and non-binding forum for foreign policy consultation which imposed absolutely minimal obligations (consultation and confidentiality) on participants and lacked enforcement mechanisms. Third, that the exclusion of the European Court of Justice, the weak association of the European Commission, and the testimonial role of the European Parliament gave member states a large degree of independence and autonomy of action. And fourth, that member states preferences were quite stable and were dictated by international rather than by domestic factors. In accordance with these assumptions, it was easy to conclude that European foreign policy was just the lowest common denominator of member states’ interests.

As noted above, however, these assumptions could not hold long in the face of a solid body of theory (regime theory) which described and explained how intergovernmental cooperation could
result in the creation of norms and in norm-oriented behavior. Rather than just facilitating agreement, regime theory maintained that cooperation could unleash a process in which patterned behavior would result in convergent expectations, which in turn would open the way for conventionalized behavior, which would generate recognized norms and appropriate standards of behavior (Krasner 1983: 8-9). Clearly, this dynamic strongly resembles the communauté d’information, communauté d’vues, and communauté d’action model sought by the designers of EPC back in the seventies.

The challenge to realist assumptions about EPC was also supported by existing empirical evidence, which indicated a substantial degree of policy convergence among EPC participants. But it was also evident in studies of the evolution of EPC, which indicated how even the loose intergovernmental arena which the EPC of the seventies represented needed minimal procedural norms to function and how these norms eventually turned into standards of behavior (the so-called cotumier) which were accepted by the participants as valid references for solving conflicts (soft-law) and as basis for future binding treaties (Dehousse and Weiler 1991, Smith 1996). The EPC/CFSP, Smith (1998: 26) argued, had started out as an effort at policy coordination, but had ended up being a consensual process of knowledge creation, transmission and recreation which decisively affected national interests and helped create a collective identity. And here, once again, empirical evidence confirms that thirty years of foreign policy cooperation have resulted in the EU having an international personality of its own and, hence, policy positions on a wide variety of issues clearly differentiating the EU from the United States.

Viewing EPC/CSFP from the sociological institutionalist perspective helps us, however, to trace the line that can be traced from the outcome (policy change) back to the existence of an institutional setting which helps participant states achieve national goals, but which, at the same time, affects the preferences of its participant members. Evidence about the EPC/CFSP impact on participant states’ interests is, however, just a first step. Next, attention has to be paid both to mechanisms of change, which, Smith (2000: 614) has suggested, are elite socialization, bureaucratic reorganization, constitutional change, and the increase in public support for CFSP. However, regardless of whether the EPC/CSFP may be considered as an independent variable (the “pressure for change” in the Europeanisation literature), the mere existence of this policy framework does not suffice to explain variation in policy outcomes.

This represents a major shortcoming because evidence shows that the impact of this regime varies across countries (e.g. the Europeanisation of foreign policy seems higher in Spain that in Austria or Sweden), but
also within countries (depending who is in government, Socialists or conservatives, as is the case of Spain presented here). In practice, organizational isomorphism is very limited, if not non-existent, and national contexts mediate both whether adaptation pressures are accepted or rejected and the ways in which this is done (Hill and Wallace 1996, Page 1995).

Research has therefore to focus on the intervening variables which determine the intensity and variation of impact. However, while there is agreement that “domestic conditions” act as an intervening variable, facilitating or impeding policy change, there is little consensus on what these domestic conditions exactly are or how they operate. Grouping them in two categories, those related to interests and those related to ideas (Boerzel and Risse 2000) has two advantages: first, it facilitates the formulation and testing of hypotheses and, second, it makes it possible to relate our findings to the wider theoretical discussion between rational, historical and sociological institutionalism. As, methodologically, interest-based explanations should come first (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 6), I will first examine the extent to which Europeanization in the Spanish case can be accounted for in terms of interests.

The processes of policy convergence and policy transfer described above proves that to the extent that Spain became an active proponent of the strengthening of the EPC/CFSP after its accession to the EC in 1986, it did so mostly for instrumental reasons and through an incremental and cautious approach. This is evident when looking at the institutional, international and domestic dimensions of Spanish participation in EPC/CSFP.

At the institutional level, this has translated in an attempt to reconcile the increase of EU capabilities with the preservation of national interests and autonomy. On the one hand, they have been in favor of further institutionalization and the usage of qualified majority rules and pillar I instruments at the implementation stage, thus facilitating the success of EU strategies. On the other hand, Spanish governments have defended the maintenance of unanimity procedures to define CFSP’s goal and strategies, thus ensuring that Spanish interests in Latin America and the Mediterranean would always be kept high in EU (Barbé 2000: 49).

At the international level, effects are of two types. First, the EPC/CFSP has allowed Spain to become a full and influential member of the international community. Second, being an active proponent of political integration and of strengthening Europe’s international identity has given Spanish governments more political influence than its economic weight alone would have allowed.
As predicted by Smith (2000: 627), effects at the domestic level have been both organizational and political. Participation in EPC/CFSP has facilitated the modernization of the foreign service, allowed the Foreign Ministry to maintain its central role in the foreign policy-making process and help it to resist competitive pressures from other ministries and levels of government (Molina and Rodrigo 2001, Dastis 1991). Also, it has facilitated a substantial change in public opinion views concerning foreign policy and security issues: Spaniards have progressively left behind isolationist attitudes and accepted as natural the participation of Spanish troops in peace-keeping operations. Obviously, the theme of Spain’s new international standing has been conveniently used for electoral purposes by both Socialist González and conservative Aznar (Barbé 2000: 45-48).

Interests alone, however, cannot fully account for the varying intensity of the process of Europeanization suffered by Spanish foreign policy and, more in particular, for the decaying interest on this process shown by conservative Aznar and his party since they gained power in 1996. Variation in patterns of Europeanization show that foreign policy is not just another public policy. Beyond a policy aimed at the maximization of the opportunities offered by the international context, foreign policy is about identity, about who are we, what do we want to achieve and who do we want to achieve it with (Hill and Wallace 1996: ix, Marks 1997: 157). Foreign policy expresses thus the collective project of a society or the dominant group at a given moment in time and in a given context, and therefore “European identity” can be understood as the role which Europe plays in the collective project of a society (Risse 1997). Of course, this collective project, and the place Europe plays in it, does not need to be consensual or permanent, it may be contested, is subject to change and can even be highly controversial or divisive: within the same country, Europe may be seen as a threat by some groups and an opportunity to advance their interests by others (Marcussen et al. 1999).

As Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung (1997: 4) have suggested, testing the explanatory power of ideas is particularly appropriate in cases where actors have different preferences despite similar interests, or in the game theory jargon, when there are various equilibrium points (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 9). The study of the role of ideas, beliefs or identities, it has been argued, must be included when
studying how Europeanization patterns vary across and within countries (Caporaso, Cowles and Risse 1998: 16) and can be effectively used to answer to the questions about the temporality, spread, and context-boundness of Europeanization (Goetz 2000: 223-4).

In the Socialists’ case, I will argue, there has been a perfect fit or resonance between the process of European integration and their collective project, which placed Europe at the center of a program consisting in overcoming a past characterized of isolationism, domestic strife, lack of political freedom and economic backwardness. With “Europe” having become so intimately part of the definition of national interests, the Socialists obviously saw in the EPC/CFSP an opportunity to build a new international identity for Spain and actively promoted the Europeanization of Spanish foreign policy. In contrast, the conservatives have never shared this consideration of European interests as an indistinguishable part of Spain’s national interests. Whereas the process of European integration has traditionally been the focal point of the Socialists’ ideas concerning Spanish national identity (Jáuregui 2000: 3), the conservatives have better realized their collective identity in the Atlantic community and through economic achievements.

This is clearly seen in the different issues Socialists and conservatives have selected to show their success in the field of foreign and European policy: whereas the Socialists have emphasized their contribution to European integration in terms of the construction of an European foreign and security identity, citizenship rights and redistributive policies (the Cohesion Fund), the Conservatives have emphasized Spain’s full integration into NATO military structure, justice and interior issues, deregulation, privatization and accession to EMU’s third phase on Spain’s own merit.

Conservatives have thus seen the European Union much more in terms of a large and integrated market in which Spain could prosper and achieve national goals, such as admission to the club of the richest countries (G-8) or international recognition as the economic and cultural leader of the Spanish speaking world. Therefore, whereas the Socialists’ pursuit of national interests has been to link them to further integration and both preferences and national interests have been constructed in a manner indissolubly linked to EU membership (Closa 1995: 295), the conservatives have understood national and European interests as two different levels whose accommodation has to be
studied on a pragmatic case-by-case basis and not be taken for granted. [14]

5. Beliefs about Europe

In 1898, the loss of Cuba against the United States, popularly known in Spain as just the “Disaster”, paved the way for a whole generation of intellectuals to reflect on Spanish history and national identity. Interpreting Spanish history in terms of a constant struggle between modernity and tradition, they concluded that Spain’s seclusion from Europe had been definitive to turn the balance against the forces of modernization. Only the “Europeanization” of Spain could make the triumph of modernity irreversible, they concluded (Jáuregui 2000). [15]

The trauma of 1898 paled in comparison to that provoked by the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and the subsequent imposition of Franco’s regime (1939-1975), events which consolidated this view of Spanish history as a struggle between the “two Spains”. General Franco’s regime (1939-1975) cultivated an extremely nationalistic identity based on the myths of empire, language, statehood and religion. Spain was not isolated, the official propaganda argued, but self-excluded from a world where two options dominated: liberalism, whose individualism was a dangerous source of corruption of Catholic values and personal ethics, and Communism, which was simply evil. Spaniards were asked to be proud of being different, of having based their political system on institutions such as the family, church and (single) trade union. To the outside, this “national-Catholic” ideology promoted the consideration of Spain as the “motherland” of all Latin American peoples, conveniently labeled by the propaganda as “Spanish-American” (Hispanoamericano) and cultivated links with Arab nationalists — despite Franco having made his career in the colonial wars against Morocco, Arab regimes were equally authoritarian and both anti-American and anti-communist, and thus were good strategic allies in the United Nations —.

Obviously, while much of the population accepted this rhetoric and proudly hooked on this national-Catholic identity, it made the most progressive ranks of Spanish society feel ashamed and further strengthenend their identification with Europe as the bearer of democratic, humanistic, and universal values. Just as in Germany (Risse 1997, Marcussen et al. 1999, Banchoff 1999), the abuse Franco perpetrated on Spanish national and international identity made it impossible for many Spaniards later on to base their identity on these myths of language, empire, religion and statehood. Therefore, it left an empty space for feelings of Europeanness to accommodate in peoples’ identity and, ultimately, allowed them to reconstitute their national identities in more cosmopolitan ways. [16]
Prior to the Civil War, the Spanish Socialist party had already been strongly influenced by this vision of Europeanization as an opportunity to modernize Spain, so after the war, once in exile and as a clandestine party, the Socialists found it relatively easy to add a political dimension (democratization) to Europeanization. The synergistic relationship between Europe and the Spanish Socialists was further consolidated in 1962 when following the Birkelbach Report of the EEC Parliamentary Assembly denying non-democratic countries the right to EEC membership, the EEC refused to start association talks with Spain and offered only a trade agreement, which was signed in 1970. Contrary to the US, whose 1953 military agreements with Spain had rehabilitated Franco’s international image and allowed Spain to become member of the UN (1957), the Socialists thanked the EEC for not allowing Franco to benefit politically or economically from approaching the EC. This led them to welcome pressure on Franco’s government repression of both political dissidence and national minorities in Spain. “Europe” was thus part of the foundational identity of Spanish socialists who considered EC membership as an integral part of Spain’s democratic evolution (Holmes 1983: 177, Barbé 1996b: 109).

As seen, once in government, European foreign and security policy offered an ideal way out for the dilemmas faced by the Spanish Socialist government. On the one hand, González’s interpretation of Spanish history led him to believe that neutralism and isolationism worked not only against the role in world politics which corresponded to Spain according to its history and economic weight, but also very strongly against the modernization of Spain itself. Fully participating in the Atlantic and European foreign and security policy system, it became evident, would help provide a new role for the Spanish army, away from colonial experience and intervention in politics. Also, it would contribute to change the rather anti-militarist attitudes of Spanish public opinion, which were considered not only as a generic obstacle to Spain’s full presence in the international arena but, more precisely, as incompatible with González’s wish that Spain be considered an equal among the big four EU member states. As this strengthening of Europe’s international identity required not only the improvement of EPC/CFSP instruments, but an overall increase in EU policy-making capacity, Spain also became an active proponent of further political and economic integration. Spanish national interests were thus best served by a more active, efficient and generous EU, both internally as externally. [17]
Spain was thus able to realize national interests through an integrationist discourse (promotion of policies related to European issues such as European citizenship and identity). Clearly, these ambitions ultimately explain why the Socialist government became very active in the EPC/CFSP, why it designed its participation in the system so as to increase its efficiency, and why it sought to constitutionalize both goals and procedures in every occasion it could (even though it sought to retain unanimity on some matters). As observers noted (Marks 1997: 108; Ortega 1994: 153), national and European interests became so tightly woven to each other that it was difficult to distinguish one from the other. As González’s himself put it, Europe had become “the frontier of our ambitions”, meaning that, in his view, Spaniards could achieve little or nothing of their collective project beyond or without the EU (González 1999).

The party of José M. Aznar, in power since 1996, holds however a completely different view of Europe. This is also rooted in a particular interpretation of Spanish history, albeit different from the Socialist one, and which results in a completely different approach to Europe and European integration. Rather than seeing accession to the EU in 1986 as a turning point in Spanish modern history, as the Socialists have often done, the conservatives build national pride around the achievement of economic rather than political goals. Rather than seeing the Franco regime as a bloody and costly turn away from the modernization road with Spain had taken in the thirties during the II Republic (1931-1936), they consider Franco’s regime prototypical of a Southern European (authoritarian) way to economic development. In the first case, Francoism is seen as a parentheses in Spanish history, an anomaly proving Spanish backwardness, isolation temptations and the incapacity of its elite to modernize the country (González 1987: 179). In the second case, conservatives hail the success of Franco’s so-called “technocrats” in setting the socioeconomic basis which would make democracy possible later on (Pérez-Díaz and Rodríguez 1997).

According to this vision, the two major events in the Spanish road to Europe would be, first, the Stabilization Plan of 1959, which put an end to autarky, developed Spain’s industry and modern services and aligned the Spanish economy to the European market and, second, 1998, when Spain’s accession on its own merit to EMU’s third stage led the conservative government to affirm that a hundred years later after colonial defeat, Spain was fully back to Europe as an equal and respected partner (Rodrigo 1998).

Seeing accession to the EC as part of a wider process of modernization, and not sharing the
traumatic view of Spanish history which pointed to the need to tie the country irreversibly to
Europe, has allowed the conservatives to adopt a much more pragmatic and utilitarian vision of
Europe. Contrary to the Socialists, the conservatives do not see political integration as a necessary
counterbalance to the liberal economic project which the EU represented, and realized their
national identity much more by belonging to NATO and showing economic efficiency than by an
eventual European federation and the achievement of a social Europe. This has resulted in a public
discourse centered on European “construction” or “institutional efficiency” rather than, as the
Socialist had done, in terms of “integration” or “federalism”. Also, while the Socialists had
emphasized issues such as “social Europe”, or “cohesion”, the conservatives’ European policy has
emphasized, on the one hand, issues related with Spanish economic growth — such as
privatization, deregulation and market-oriented reforms — and, on the other hand, issues related to
the increase of the state’s control and authority — such as cooperation in law and public order

Such a major change in Spain’s European orientation (Rodrigo and Torreblanca 2001), has
provoked a heated domestic debate over which policy, Aznar’s uncompromising
intergovernmentalist style or González’s pragmatic federalism, best serves Spain’s national
interests. Though the analysis of this debate is not the object of this paper, if only because it is
evident that the problem lies in the two parties’ different views of Spanish history, interests and
needs, it is important to note the different impact of each view in terms of Europeanization.
Clearly, whereas the Socialists believed that diplomatic capacity would give Spain the role of a
major player (hence the strengthening of the EPC/CSFP and the promotion of European
integration), the conservatives openly maintain that only after the closing of Spain’s welfare gap
with Europe, brought by deregulation and market-oriented reforms, will Spain achieve the role of a
major player (hence the emphasis on privatization and economic reforms). In the first case, the
status of a major player was seen as something a middle-range power such as Spain could achieve
through the added-value obtained by personal charisma, the ability to identify focal points, manage
interdependencies and be recognized as such by the other players. In the second case, major
players are seen just as those which combine a strong national identity with the economic means to
realize their national ambitions.

In both cases, therefore, European policies, and attitudes toward Europeanization have been
instrumental to a particular set of identities. The difference lies in the way that, in the Socialist
case, identity has played the role of enhancing policy convergence and Europeanization whereas in the conservative case, identity has been a barrier or inhibitor to further Europeanization. Furthermore, in the conservatives’ case, the level of Europeanization already reached by the Socialist predecessors has also very clearly worked as an obstacle to the realization of the conservatives’ identity and preferred European policies.

The different European identities held by the Spanish Socialists and the conservatives go a long way towards explaining these parties’ different European policies. These identities, and the concepts of citizenship they lend their support to, are crucial to understand why the Socialists promoted the Europeanization of Spanish foreign policy and why conservatives have preferred to center their attention on issues related to justice and home affairs. The European identity of the Socialists proved congruent with the regime and international identity-building process in which Europeans were engaged for most of the eighties and nineties and thus echoed each other. In contrast to this resonance between ideas and institutions, the international identity of Spanish conservatives, being more Atlantic than European, has produced greater policy dissonance, thereby resulting in a greater level of tension between European and national interests. In both cases, however, participation in the EPC/CSFP has constrained and transformed the participants and their policy options far beyond their own expectations.

Conclusion

“Effective foreign policy”, Hill and Wallace (1996: 8) have written, “rests upon a shared sense of national identity, of a nation-state’s place in the world, its friends and enemies, its interests and aspirations. These underlying assumptions are embedded in national history and myth, changing slowly over time as political leaders reinterpret them and external and internal developments reshape them. Debates about foreign policy take place within the constraints this conventional wisdom about national interests sets upon acceptable choices, they symbols and reference points they provide enabling ministers to related current decisions to familiar ideas”.

As this case study shows, whether strategic rationality adequately explains how actors behave in a given context, the explanation of how actors’ preferences emerge and how are they are shaped or
constrained by institutions requires different instruments and concepts. Both the Socialist and the conservative governments behaved strategically in choosing the best set of means to achieve their goals. However, they both framed their actions within the same symbolic and affective framework of seeking international acceptance and recognition and allowed beliefs about Europe to predetermine the selection of goals each player would seek. Both Socialist and conservatives’ actions have therefore manifested the enduring “tension between action based on a logic of appropriateness and justification based on a logic of consequentiality” which is so characteristic of political institutions (March and Olsen 1989: 162).

Each government’s choice of the set of elements through which it would realize this goal of acceptance and recognition can be explained by looking at the set of beliefs about Spain, its history and its relation to Europe which each government held. Therefore, while contextual factors such as historic exclusion or economic backwardness may create a propitious environment for Europeanization in Southern and Central and Eastern Europe, the beliefs about Europe held by domestic political forces and the need to gain recognition seem crucial to explain why some European countries are willing to align their foreign policies faster than others and why some domestic political forces may be willing to lose autonomy and control over large parts of their national agenda. Beliefs about Europe can thus be used to explain varying patterns of Europeanization across but also within countries.

Contrary to the expectations of rationalist institutionalism, European institutions have not shown to be neutral. The impact of Europeanization, I have showed, has extended beyond policy outcomes to decisively affect Spanish national interests, which have themselves been Europeanized. Europeanization at the national level, it has also been shown, is a two-way street for institutionalization at the European level: once Europeanization pressures enter the domestic realm, if they resonate with the identities of national actors, they can lead to the institutionalization of national interests at the European level and a strengthening of European foreign policy capacity which may be difficult to reverse if domestic conditions change and different actors with different identities come to power. As Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 8) have showed, ideas can therefore not only act providing generic road maps or affecting outcomes in situations of equilibrium, they can also institutionalize themselves and condition subsequent actor’s strategies.
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[1] See DiMaggio and Powell (1991: 6-7) for a discussion of the connections between the literature on regimes and sociological institutionalism. See also Torreblanca (1998), and Friis and Murphy (1999) for a “governance” perspective of EU foreign policy.

[2] For the sake of simplicity, I group both *Partido Popular* (PP) and *Unión de Centro Democrático* (UCD) under the label “conservative”. I am aware that this might be considered inaccurate: after all, both parties have or had strong liberal or neoliberal orientations. However, the same holds true regarding the Socialist Party. “Conservative” and “Socialist” are therefore used interchangeable with “center-right” and “center-left”.

[3] Suárez’s attendance of the Conference of Non-Aligned countries held in Havana in 1979 exemplified the troubled international identity of Spanish democrats. In return, proving that the West was not yet fully sure as to whether the young Spanish democrats were or wanted to be part of it — the case of Portugal also exemplifying this kind of post-authoritarian foreign policy hesitations — , the US Ambassador in Madrid, Terence Todman, convinced US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, to consider the assault of the Parliament by right-wing army officers in February 1981 and the seizure of its 350 democratically-elected members as “an internal matter of Spain”. This clearly proved that Spain had not fully gained yet international recognition as a Western democracy whose fate was worth fighting for.

[4] It is revealing of democratic Spain’s approach to the EC that prime minister Suárez (1977-1981) removed accession negotiations with the EC from the Foreign Ministry and created a special Ministry for Relations with the European Communities: accession to the EC was not just another dimension of Spanish foreign policy, a fact which was evident also in the way the Spanish Constitution of 1978 included an article envisaging the transfer of sovereignty to international institutions and the supremacy and direct effect of legislation resulting from this transfer.

[5] Morán says that he clearly perceived that the personal meetings of González with Kohl, Craxi and Lubbers were having a lot of influence on González’s views on the question. Also, while he rejects any direct pressure or linkage between EU and NATO membership, he recognizes that he and González were
completely aware of the fact that all their European colleagues expected them to maintain Spain in NATO (Morán 1990: 309).

[6] Bomberg and Peterson (2000) use the term “policy transfer” to refer to processes of learning and policy imitation. I use it in the sense of “exporting” national agendas or policies to the European level.

[7] “Spanish policy-makers have tended to see Europe and Latin America as mutually reinforcing: the stronger the ‘embeddedness’ in the incrementally accumulating dynamics of the EU, the stronger would be the force of its own political and economic presence in Latin America” (Youngs 2000: 108)

[8] In 1999 Spain ranked sixth in the list of world’s investors (fourth in terms of GDP/foreign investment ration). Of the $ 35.4 billion which Spanish firms invested abroad, 63% was targeted at Latin America, where Spain accounted for 53% of all foreign investment in the region, ahead of the US (“Spanish Foreign Policy at the Turn of Century, Foreign Minister Piqué at the London School of Economics, 24 January 2001, http://www.mae.es).

[9] The European Council meeting in Cannes in 1995, where a direct link between PHARE and MEDA funds was made, is a clear example of this approach. This strategy of making national and European interests coincide was recurrent in González. It applied to Latin America and the Mediterranean but also to Spain’s position within the EU. This strategy explains both his success in obtaining gains, e.g. the Cohesion Fund, as well as Aznar’s difficulties in preserving them. González did not ask first for money to Spain: he first advanced a principle, such as territorial cohesion, which all member states would agree was beneficial for the EU as a whole, both in terms of efficiency and legitimacy, and only then discuss its materialization (Closa 1995: 303).

[10] The figures of EU-Moroccan fisheries agreement are revealing: in 1995, Spain consumed 45% of the overall EU budget for fisheries agreements with third countries. The 1995-1999 agreement involved 534 vessels (57,000 tons) and its yearly cost for the EU budget was of 125 million euro (El País, 27 March 2001).

[11] Some of these analyses overlook the fact that many member states and opinion groups see the identity of the EU as being threatened and not served by Eastern enlargement. Therefore, it is impossible to set up the debate in terms of norms, pushing for enlargement, against interests, pushing against enlargement. Elsewhere I have suggested a way of examining how preferences for integration and preferences for enlargement interact which each other (Torreblanca 2001).

[12] In 1994, EU member states had voted together in the United Nations on 91% of all the occasions (EFPB 95/131). According to Johansson, cited in Barbé (2000: 57), between 1955 and 1999, the rate was of 83%. Spain and Germany had a convergence degree of 96%.

[13] In 1992, polls showed that 67% of the population considered that Spain’s international position had markedly improved in the last ten years (Campo 1992). It is telling that average support for European Union membership was lower between 1981-1985, i.e. before membership, than after accession. Between 1981 and 1985, average support was of 60%, whereas between 1986-1990, average support was grew to 77% (Eurobarometer 1994: 56).
Compare González’s definition of Europe as the “frontier of our ambition” (González 1999) with Aznar’s comments at the Spanish Parliament criticizing the “infantile sickness leading people to believe that Europeanization is always good” (Spanish Cortes. Debate on the European Council meeting in Lisbon. Sesión Plenaria 198, 1 July 1992. Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, IV Legislatura, , No. 204, p. 10016).

In a famous sentence which Spanish elites often cite, philosopher Ortega y Gasset wrote: “to feel the ills of Spain is to desire to be European … Regeneration is the desire, Europeanization is the means to satisfy it. It was clearly seen from the beginning that Spain was the problem, and Europe the solution”, in Jáuregui (1999: 275).

In 1999, Spain ranked third after Luxembourg and Italy in feelings of Europeanness. 56% of Spaniards said they felt Spanish and European, whereas 26% felt only Spanish (Eurobarometer 2000: 10). In a different sample, 65% of conservatives voters felt “only Spanish”, in contrast to 45% of Socialist voters (ASP 1999).

See the program of the Spanish Presidency of 1995 (EFPB 95/204) and the Position adopted in the 1996 IGC (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores 1996).

See Prime Minister González presenting the conclusion of accession negotiations with the EU on March 1985 in the following terms: “a trascendental, irreversible step has been taken early this morning … it is the culmination of a process of struggle for millions of Spaniards who have identified freedom and democracy with integration in Western Europe”, quoted in Jáuregui (2000: 1), my emphasis.